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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2841 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRUCE GORDON LOW, JR., 
                                            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00791-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 23, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Bruce Gordon Low, Jr. was sentenced to 120 months‟ imprisonment 
following our remand for resentencing.  He appeals.  Counsel has filed a motion to 
 2 
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
asserting that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  We will affirm and grant 
counsel‟s motion to withdraw. 
I. 
Low was charged in a two-count information with unlawful possession with intent 
to distribute 50 grams of crack cocaine (Count I), and possession of a firearm after having 
been convicted of a felony (Count II).  On September 28, 2006, he pled guilty to both 
counts. 
Over the course of the next two years, Low was represented by four separate 
attorneys before proceeding pro se at his sentencing hearing on October 21, 2008.
1
  The 
District Court sentenced Low to a term of imprisonment of 151 months on the first count 
and 120 months on the second count to run concurrently.  On appeal, we held that the 
District Court had violated Low‟s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because “it forced 
him to proceed pro se without providing an adequate Faretta/Welty colloquy.”  United 
States v. Low, 401 F. App‟x 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2010).  We remanded for resentencing.  
For Low‟s resentencing, the probation office revised its presentence report and 
calculated his total offense level to be 31, which represented an adjusted offense level of 
34 less 3 points for acceptance of responsibility, and his criminal history category to be a 
                                                 
1
 The District Court did assign his fourth attorney, John F. Renner, Esq., to act as standby 
counsel.  The same attorney represented him at his second sentencing hearing and 
currently represents him on appeal.   
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III.  The result was a sentencing guideline range of 135 to 168 months.   
At his resentencing, Low, represented by Mr. Renner, asked the District Court to 
vary downward, based principally upon his extensive post-conviction rehabilitation.
2
  The 
District Court agreed, granting a 15-month downward variance and sentencing Low to a 
term of imprisonment of 120 months on each count to be served concurrently.  This 
appeal followed. 
II.
3
 
 Under Anders, if court-appointed appellate counsel determines there are no 
nonfrivolous issues for appeal, he or she may seek to withdraw from representing an 
indigent criminal defendant.  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Our review is plenary over whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  See 
Simon v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)).  We must consider: “1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the requirements of Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), and 2) whether 
an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. at 114.  
 To satisfy the first step, counsel must conclude that there are no nonfrivolous  
issues for appeal after reviewing the record, advise us of his or her conclusions, and  
                                                 
2
 In addition, Low asked the District Court to downward depart to a lower criminal 
history category and to vary from the 18:1 crack/powder ratio established by the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”).  The District Court denied Low‟s requests, and Low 
does not appeal the denials.   
3
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
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request permission to withdraw.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 299-300 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Moreover, counsel must submit a “brief referring to anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal,” and explain why the issues appellant wishes to raise 
on appeal are frivolous.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780-81. 
“[W]hat is required is a determination that the appeal lacks any basis in law or fact.” 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988); see Youla, 241 F.3d at 
300-01. 
At the second step, we conduct an independent review of the record to assess 
whether it presents any nonfrivolous issues.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  “Where the 
Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face, the proper course is for the appellate 
court to be guided in reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself.” Id. at 301 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  However, “„in those cases in which frivolousness 
is patent,‟ we will not appoint new counsel even if an Anders brief is insufficient to 
discharge current counsel‟s obligations to his or her client and this court.” United States v. 
Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781).  We also, 
of course, consider an appellant‟s pro se filings.  If we determine that the appeal is 
without merit, we must grant appellate counsel‟s motion to withdraw and dispose of the 
appeal without appointing new counsel. 
Low‟s counsel contends that there are no nonfrivolous issues for review on appeal. 
However, he fails to address the issues raised by Low in his pro se brief, which gives us 
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some pause as to whether counsel has satisfied his obligation to conduct a “conscientious 
examination” of the record.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  Thus, we must decide whether 
Low‟s appeal is patently frivolous despite the Anders brief that has been submitted.  See 
Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781 (finding Anders brief deficient in part because counsel failed to 
address whether client‟s pro se arguments lacked merit). 
The arguments Low raises in his pro se brief are plainly without merit.  First, Low 
contends that the District Court violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws when it 
employed the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines Manual and Supplement.  Pursuant to the FSA, 
the 2010 Supplement eliminated the two-level offense level reduction for which Low had 
previously qualified under the 2008 Manual.
4
 Generally, a district court must use the 
Guidelines Manual and its amendments in effect on the date of sentencing, unless the 
court determines that such use would violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.  
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11; see also United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 
177, 193 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Where an amendment to a section of the sentencing guidelines 
occurs following the convicted offense conduct and the amendment results in harsher 
penalties than were in effect at the time of the conduct, the ex post facto clause . . . 
require[s] the District Court to apply the sentencing guidelines in effect on the date that 
the offense of conviction was committed.”).  
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 The two-level reduction was generally applicable in cases in which the drug offense 
involved crack and one or more controlled substances.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2D1.1, app. n.10(D)(i) (2008).  Thus, in Low‟s case his base offense level for 
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Under both the 2008 and 2010 guidelines, Low‟s base offense level was calculated 
to be 32 pursuant to the guideline for drug offenses.  While the 2008 Manual included a 
two-level reduction for drug offenses involving crack cocaine as well as other controlled 
substances, it also had a higher marijuana conversion for crack cocaine.  The 2010 
Supplement lowered the marijuana conversion for crack cocaine and eliminated the two-
level reduction, but after completing all appropriate drug conversions and adding the drug 
quantities, Low‟s base offense level remained at 32.  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Supp. 1-26 (effective Nov. 1, 2010).  Because application of the 2010 Supplement did not 
result in a harsher penalty, no ex post facto concerns are present in this case.
5
 
Second, Low argues that the elimination of the two-level reduction was a 
substantive amendment to the guidelines, and should not have had retroactive application 
at his re-sentencing.  In United States v. Marmolejos, we recognized “the established 
principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments 
                                                                                                                                                             
the quantity of combined drugs under the 2008 Manual was 34, but it was reduced to 32 
pursuant to the two-level reduction. 
5
 Low also maintains that the District Court should have treated the “one-book rule” as 
advisory and should have applied both the two-level reduction from the 2008 guidelines 
as well as the lower marijuana conversion from the 2010 supplement because otherwise 
the end result of his guideline calculation remaining the same before and after the 
enactment of the FSA “is fundamentally unfair.”  Low‟s Brief 5.  Under the guidelines, a 
district court must apply the “Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date . . . in its 
entirety.”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).  Thus, contrary to Low‟s 
contention, the District Court could not apply provisions of the 2008 guidelines in 
conjunction with the 2010 Supplement to the guidelines, but had to apply the entire 
guidelines manual in effect at the time of Low‟s resentencing. In this case, as there were 
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should be given effect if it „clarifies‟ the guideline or comment in place at the time of 
sentencing,” while also noting that if an “amendment effects a substantive change in the 
law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision.” 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).  Therefore, if a post-sentencing amendment “clarifies” a 
guideline, the remedy would be a remand to give the district court an opportunity to 
consider the amendment.  Here, the 2010 Supplement, which eliminated the two-point 
reduction, went into effect before Low‟s resentencing and the District Court considered 
the elimination as part of Low‟s policy argument against the 18:1 crack/powder ratio. 
Thus, there simply is no post-sentencing amendment for us to consider, much less 
whether to apply it retroactively to Low‟s new sentence on appeal. 
Lastly, Low argues that the District Court never acknowledged the advisory role of 
the guidelines post-Booker, and treated the “one-book rule” as mandatory.  See United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  As previously discussed, the District Court was 
required to apply the 2010 Guidelines Manual in its entirety, so long as there were no ex 
post facto concerns.  Additionally, the District Court appropriately followed the dictates 
of Booker and the sentencing procedures outlined us in resentencing Low.  Specifically, 
the District Court correctly calculated Low‟s applicable guidelines range, noted the 
mandatory minimum for the drug offense, ruled upon all motions for departure, and 
„“after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem[ed] 
                                                                                                                                                             
no ex post facto concerns, the 2010 Guidelines Manual and Supplement that was in effect 
at Low‟s resentencing, was properly applied in its entirety. 
 8 
appropriate,‟ the court . . . „exercise[d] its discretion‟ through „meaningful consideration 
[of] the § 3553(a) factors‟ before deciding on a sentence.” United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); 
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Furthermore, the District 
Court exercised its discretion in varying 15 months below the applicable guidelines range 
and selected a sentence that “falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be 
considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 
207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, a review of the record demonstrates there are no 
nonfrivolous issues with regard to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of Low‟s 
new sentence. 
IV.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant  
counsel‟s motion to withdraw.  We also find, pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(b), 
that the issues presented in this appeal lack legal merit for the purposes of counsel filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.   
 
